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Abstract: This article examines Cornelia Woll’s book on the “power of collective
inaction” in which she argues that banks could extract favorable bailouts in the
recent global financial crisis by remaining collectively inactive. Collective inaction
forces governments to bear the brunt of the crisis resolutions. While this book
provides an illuminating account of banking bailouts in several countries, its
argument neglects the power of governments and of individual banks.
Governments did not have to wait for banks’ (in)action but could impose punitive
conditions on banks. And the resistance by banks did not originate from an
incapacity to act collectively but from deliberate actions by individual banks to
obstruct government intrusion. Rather than inaction on the part of banks, these
interactions between governments and banks involved deliberate action and their
outcome depended onmore conventional notions of state-business power relations.
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1 Examining Banking Bailouts
In “The Power of Inaction”, Cornelia Woll examines the six largest bank bailouts
during the global financial crisis after the failure of Lehman Brothers in the fall
of 2008. For these bailouts, the governments spent billions of dollars to save
banks from collapsing and risked multiples of their economies’ output by
granting state guarantees on banks’ liabilities. Considering the prolonged reces-
sion in the aftermath of the crisis, Woll addresses the pertinent issue of banks’
power to dump their risks onto the state.
Woll’s book provides an in-depth and rich study of the recent bailouts,
which no other available volume matches. She pays attention to important
and often-neglected aspects around bailouts, like the structure of the finan-
cial sector and the interaction among banks. With her comparative approach,
Woll also goes beyond the commonplace that banks are powerful. While
recognizing that banks are generally influential, she shows convincingly
that banks in some countries could wring generous bailouts from the govern-
ment, while in others, they ended up paying dearly. Although I am not
convinced of her argument about the power of collective inaction, I find
the book to be a major advance in the debate about the politics of banking
bailouts with a rich presentation of crisis events based inter alia on her own
interviews.
2 The Power of Inaction
Woll starts the book with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when the US
government and banks failed to arrange a rescue. About this episode, H.
Rodgin Cohen, a Wall-Street lawyer Woll quotes, said that he had the impression
the government was “playing a game of chicken or poker” (Financial Crisis
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Inquiry Commission, 2011, p.334; Woll, 2014, p.2). She takes up this game-of-
chicken metaphor and argues that governments and banks find themselves in a
comparable confrontation. During crises, banks and governments can either stay
on course doing nothing, or they can yield. The one who yields loses this game
and has to bear the costs. And if both the government and the banks do nothing,
they cause a financial crash.
Here, Woll adds a twist to this game. “But if the financial industry knows
that the government will not let this happen, their best strategy is to be
uncoordinated and benefit from a bank bailout scheme financed entirely
through the public budget” (Woll, 2014, p.59). This twist is Woll’s “power of
in-action.” If banks are unwilling or incapable to act, they impel the government
to give in and rescue the financial system. Woll (2014, pp.58f) argues that banks
avoid this risky strategy and cooperate with the government if they individually
believe the other banks cooperate, if they have experienced a crisis before, and if
they can exchange among each other.
Whether banks or governments yield, Woll (2014, p.62) argues, matters for
taxpayers. If banks give in and cooperate, they share the burden of the bailout.
In this case, banks pay, and the costs to taxpayers are small. If banks resist, the
costs to taxpayers depend on whether the government acts decisively and
imposes a tough resolution.
The financial crisis caused havoc not only in the United States but affected,
unfortunately, also a large number of other countries. The welcome side-effect
for a comparativist is that the quick spread of the crisis offers a unique possi-
bility to analyze similar business-government interactions. Woll analyzes the
bailouts in six advanced economies and compares them in pairs across different
institutional systems: The United Kingdom and the United States, Germany and
France, and Ireland and Denmark. In all these countries, except Ireland, the
governments tried to include banks in a cooperative crisis resolution. In
Denmark and France, the banks cooperated and this cooperation kept the
costs for the state small. For Germany, Woll finds that the divisions in the
banking sector precluded a cooperative solution which prompted the govern-
ment to intervene with large losses for the taxpayer. In the two liberal market
economies, the United States and the United Kingdom, neither banking sector
had a tradition of cooperation and could not easily exchange among each other.
Woll (2014, p.107ff) argues (contrary to Culpepper & Reinke, 2014, see below)
that the ultimate outcome in the United Kingdom was punitive compared to the
United States. And the reason for the punitive solution was that the British
government recognized the coordination difficulties early and imposed its own
solution.
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3 The Power of Action and the Power
of the State
Woll proposes a rich argument and presents fascinating case studies which
contribute much to our understanding about banking bailouts. However, I take
issue with four points that ultimately address Woll’s portrayal of power relations
between governments and banks. First, I am not convinced by her argument that
a well-organized banking sector should act less strategically than a fragmented
sector, and second, that it is banks’ incapacity to act collectively that forced
governments' hands. Rather, I see costly bailouts as a result of healthier banks’
unwillingness to cooperate. Third, Woll suggests that governments can bully
banks into accepting though rescue plans, but she does not specify the limits
of governments’ power or why not all governments pursued this strategy.
Finally, the negotiations about the large bailout programs did not center around
a binary choice (yielding or not yielding), as Woll argues, but around the terms
of the bailouts including the distribution of costs. In this section, I elaborate on
these four points.
The “power of inaction” implies a certain “powerlessness of action.” That is,
banks in a financial sector that can organize will recognize the public-good
nature of financial stability and bear the bailout costs. As a theoretical motiva-
tion, Woll (2014, p.59) points to Ostrom’s (2000a, 2000b) contributions about
social norms and people’s ability to produce public goods. However, judging
from banks behavior at other times (involving fraud, the rigging of interest rates,
and their continued risk taking that produced the public “bad” – the financial
crisis – that made the bailouts necessary), it is doubtful that banks really behave
like the people Ostrom observed. Rather, I would argue, banks and their man-
agers act strategically in their own narrow interests. If this is the case, it
becomes unclear why a well-organized banking sector should be more inclined
to pay for the bailout. In the logic of the chicken game, the capacity for action
should then be as powerful as inaction.
Framing the argument in terms of this game, Woll stresses the collective-
action component among banks, and she refers to the history of cooperation in
the banking sector. This focus distracts, however, from a crucial difference
between banks and from the role (or “action”) of stable banks. During financial
crises, not all banks suffer to the same extent, and those that are less affected
enjoy greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the government. Failing banks, those
that run out of funding, depend entirely on government liquidity. When these
banks negotiate with the government, they have very little leverage. They want
and need government support, be it guarantees or state capital (including partial
60 R. Reinke
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:55 PM
nationalization). Banks like Lehman Brothers, RBS or Commerzbank could not
make demands; they had to accept any government decision – and any deci-
sions by other banks. However, not all banks were as vulnerable as Lehman
Brothers or RBS. Some banks had sturdier funding structures and healthier
balance sheets (Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011). They obtained
liquidity either through markets, including retail deposits, or in exchange for
collateral from central banks, which had launched large liquidity programs
(Lenza, Pill, & Reichlin, 2010). Thus, these financially healthier banks did not
depend in the same way on fiscal government bailouts and were in a much
better negotiation position, particularly if they were highly internationalized.
Internationalized banks are not reliant on one national economy and can thus
eschew the pressure from the that country’s financial regulators (Culpepper &
Reinke, 2014). While these banks welcomed liquidity and debt-guarantee pro-
grams, they opposed state recapitalizations. Accepting state capital would make
the government a partial shareholder, allowing it to participate in future profits.
Particularly for healthier banks with good prospects of recovery after the
immediate crisis, the government’s profit participation through state capital
would prove expensive (Congressional Budget Office, 2014; Congressional
Oversight Panel, 2011). For this reason, these banks opposed inclusive bailout
programs that would place capital not only into failing banks, but into all banks.
This difference in interests and the capacity of stable, internationalized banks to
act suggest that non-cooperation may result less from “incapacity” and more
from “unwillingness” to act collectively (Woll, 2014, p.7). While Woll (2014,
pp.171f) recognizes a role of healthy banks, her argument sidetracks from their
importance. A failure of collective action differs substantially from willful
obstruction.
How could the government react in the face of banks’ unwillingness to
cooperate? Unfortunately, Woll remains ambiguous about the power of govern-
ments. Woll (2014, p.63) maintains that, in the face of financial sector resistance,
governments can impose a crisis resolution with harsh conditions for failing
banks. Her example for this stern bailout is the United Kingdom where the
government forced strict conditions on failing banks. This part of the argument
suggests that the government retains some form of power over banks – regard-
less of their inability to organize. Woll (2014, p.63) states that “it is best [for the
government] to act unilaterally and impose a government solution,” but she
does not specify the scope and limits of the government’s power. Central to the
argument would be to know under which conditions does (or can) the govern-
ments impose a punitive or even an inclusive solution. The role of state power is
particularly pertinent given that, in four of the six cases, the government faced a
non-cooperative banking sector.
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This part of Woll’s argument (about the ability of governments to bully
banks) casts doubt on the appropriateness of game-of-chicken metaphor. Using
this metaphor, Woll portrays bailouts as a confrontation in which banks and
governments face the binary choice of yielding or not yielding; between
agreeing to pay or risking failure. This metaphor rings true when we think
about the negotiations over Lehman Brothers: Everybody shied away from
action, and this failure caused market turmoil around the world. The large
bailouts occurred, however, in the fall of 2008 after Lehman collapsed. From
then on, the bailout negotiations were not about whether there would be a
rescue but, rather, over its terms. In all countries with banking crises, govern-
ments bailed out the banks. And in these negotiations, banks and governments
fought over which types of instruments should be used, which banks accept
state capital and at which terms. Accordingly, the negotiation outcomes dif-
fered substantially between countries. For instance, the British government
demanded high interest rates (12%) in exchange for state capital, but the
healthier banks allowed banks to opt out of this program. The US government
priced the capital at lower nominal rates (initially 5% and 9% after five years)
but allowed none of the major banks to opt out and additionally required
warrants (i. e. stock options), which allowed the government to reap the benefits
of banks’ recovery and generated a net gain from the bailout (Congressional
Budget Office, 2014).1
1 This is the main reason why Woll’s evaluation of the British American bailout differs from the
one given in Culpepper and Reinke (2014). Woll judges the British bailout to be punitive
because the government demanded 12% interest for its investments (as preferred shares) and
because it fired the executives of the banks that had required government recapitalizations and
restricted their remuneration. In contrast, the American government offered state capital at
lower rates and didn’t demand top bankers be sacked or their pay cut. Still, I argue that the
American bailout was overall more punitive – for two reasons: First, the American recapitaliza-
tion was not as cheap for banks as Woll suggests. In addition to the interest, the American
government demanded warrants, which allowed it to participate in banks’ future profits. These
warrants raised the price for state capital significantly. (The warrants cost Goldman Sachs USD
1.1 billion or 11% of the capital injection [Congressional Oversight Panel (2011)]).
Second, for the major banks, participation was obligatory in the United States, but voluntary
in the United Kingdom (even though the British government also tried to include all banks).
The obligatory participation for the major banks meant that relatively healthy banks partici-
pated in the costs of bailouts by paying for the warrants. In the United Kingdom, however, the
relatively healthy banks (like HSBS or Barclays) profited from the debt-guarantee program but
did not share the bailout costs. At the same time, the British government (with its high nominal
interest rate of 12%) charged mostly itself: In the two rescued banks, the government owned
a large share (83% in RBS, 41% in Lloyds [National Audit Office (2010, p.4)]). Thus, the
interest payments that the government received directly reduced the value of the shares it
owned in the bank.
62 R. Reinke
Brought to you by | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/29/19 4:55 PM
Going back to the characterization by the Wall Street lawyer H. Rodgin
Cohen, the bailout negations may resemble not so much a “game of chicken”,
but a “game of poker” (Woll, 2014, p.2). Who wins depends not merely on who
blinks first, but who holds the stronger hand. The outcome of bailout negotia-
tions results not from an incapacity to act, but from the capacity to force the
other side to give in.
In conclusion, Cornelia Woll’s book provides deep insights into the banking
bailouts of the largest financial crisis in recent history. It sheds light on the
calculus of banks and governments and argues provocatively that banks’ power
rests in in-action. Behind that in-action, however, there is surely a more con-
ventional struggle between banks and the governments – each with their own
sources of power.
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Overall, the American government generated a profit from the bank-bailout program, while
the British government was left with losses. To be sure, the governance restrictions were
stricter for the rescued banks in the British case, but both governments viewed restricting
executive pay as a second-order issue given that they tried to restore financial stability and
negotiated the distribution of risks worth billions of dollars (or pounds) between taxpayers and
banks. For these reasons, and despite the harsher governance requirements for two rescued
British banks, I find the American bailout program to be more punitive.
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